

# PTT-2025-023 – Multiple Stored Cross-Site Scripting

**CVE-ID: CVE-2025-63260**

## Credits:

Matei "Mal" Bădănoiu of Pentest-Tools.com

## Environment:

- Syncfusion v30.1.37
- <https://ej2.syncfusion.com/>

**CVSSv3: 4.6 Medium -**

**AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N**

**Note:** Internally the Syncfusion Security team considered this vulnerability to have a "High severity", even if the CVSS may not reflect that.

**Note 2:** Confidentiality and Integrity may be increased/decreased depending on the nature of the data and functionalities present in the web application that uses the vulnerable Syncfusion components.

## Description:

We identified multiple components in the Syncfusion application that are vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) payloads.

**Note:** Although the Syncfusion website does not persist changes that result in XSS, a typical production environment would store these payloads persistently and trigger them every time a user opens the respective document or chat.

## Requirements:

To perform this exploit, an attacker must understand the basics of XSS attacks.

## Proof of Concept:

We identified two vectors that allow attackers to obtain Stored XSS.

- **Stored XSS in Comment Replies:**

We tested this exploit on the "Comments Demo" at "https://ej2.syncfusion.com/javascript/demos/#/tailwind3/document-editor/comments.html".


Although the "Comment" fields themselves apply sanitization (e.g. user name is sanitized, comment is sanitized) the reply to a comment follows a different logic and results in a stored XSS vulnerability.

In order to obtain the XSS an attacker will require finding a valid Syncfusion document, leave a comment in the respective document and then leave a malicious reply to the created comment.


In this case, we injected the following malicious HTML element into the chat:

```
<img onerror= alert(2) src>
```


### Browser View:



Once the attacker submits the "Reply," the browser displays the malicious alert pop-up.



Further inspection of the resulting HTML confirms that the application displayed the "Reply" body in an unsafe manner in the browser, which caused the XSS.



- **Stored XSS in Chat UI:**


We tested this exploit on the "Instant Chat Demo" at "https://ej2.syncfusion.com/javascript/demos/#/tailwind3/chat-ui/default.html".

The application does not sanitize messages sent via the chat, and it renders them in a way that triggers XSS.


In this case the following malicious HTML element was injected into the chat:

```
<img onerror= alert(1) src>
```

**Browser View:**




Once the attacker sends the message, the browser triggers the XSS:



**Note:** In this demo case the XSS triggers twice, once for "Albert's chat" and another time for "Reena's chat".

Further inspection of the resulting HTML confirms that the application displayed the "message" in an unsafe manner in the browser, which caused the XSS.



From vulnerability scans to proof, **Pentest-Tools.com** gives 2,000+ security teams in 119 countries the speed, accuracy, and coverage to confidently validate and mitigate risks across their infrastructure (network, cloud, web apps, APIs).